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As a first step in the testing of the feasibility of the FORCE-
ORIENTED DEFENSE as a viable tactic for countering the large force
imbalance in Western Europe, a small-unit, base-case scenario is
qviantitatively examined through the medium of a manual war game.
A "Monte Carlo" type manual game v/as developed and used to refine
model logic for a subsequent investigation with an expected-value
manual game. This work generates the basis for a possible high
resolution simulation of the FORCE- ORIENTED DEFENSE. To
satisfy secondary objectives of the study, fractional kills were tab-
ulated to determine first approximations of armor/antiarmor force
exchange ratios and weapon system fractional loss rates. The
specific scenario involved a reinforced mechanized infantry platoon
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In light of the current imbalance of tactical ground forces
in Europe between the NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, it has become
imperative that maximum effective use be made of all available
personnel and material to meet the apparent threat. Recent
unclassified estimates vary as to the exact force levels and
compositions, however, most agree that the Warsaw Pact armies
have at least a three-to-one numerical superiority in main
battle tanks with, in global terms, a definite margin of
firepower superiority in conventional artillery [Refs. 1, 2,
and 3 ] .
Given any mutual and balanced force reduction, these NATO
defense forces may find themselves in an even more critical
situation: greatly over-extended defensive frontages and
minimal reserve forces. Even with conservative current un-
classified estimates, it is not unrealistic to assume that
the combat power ratio facing NATO defensive forces along the
border areas is definitely greater than seven-to-one in
armored and mechanized (motorized) infantry units [Ref. 4].
B. CURRENT DEFENSIVE TACTICS
Assuming that such unfavorable combat power ratios will
not appreciably improve in the near future, and assuming
that widely extended defensive frontages may be the rule
rather than the exception; it becomes readily apparent that
the classical forms of defense: the AREA and MOBILE DEFENSE,
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are infeasible. The reasons for this are that:
1. Successful employment of these tactics presupposes an
availability of tactical units in sufficient numbers that a
forward defense battalion will be required, under ideal cir-
cumstances, to hold no more than 5,000 meters of frontage
through actual occupation and coverage of what is not occupied
by fire [Ref. 5] and,
2. a successful mobile defense (in which controlled pene-
trations are allowed in order to inflict maximum casualties
on the attacking enemy by employment of a brigade-sized
counterattack) requires fixing forces and a large mobile re-
serve (counterattack force). But, with the quantity of
superior-in-number , armor-heavy Warsaw Pact forces potentially
employable in Western Europe, so many regimental-sized pene-
trations are possible that it would be virtually impossible
to fix (hold) and counterattack all of them [Ref. 6].
Recent economy moves have been made to bolster the effec-
tiveness of the forward defense units through the issuance of
a multitude of the latest antitank/antiarmor (AT) weapons and
surveillance, target acquisition and night observation (STANO)
devices. These, in combination with the tactical capabilities
of the attack and troop-lift helicopters, have partially off-
set the lack of ground combat units [Ref 7]
.
These technological advances, when employed in the area or
mobile defense, hardly provide a significant marginal increase
in effectiveness (when the intent is to hold terrain and de-
feat any force seeking to take the terrain from the defenders)
The forward defenses would still be so thinly spread that any
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sizable penetrations v/oulcl effectively cause the defender to
be turned out of position. One would also find the much-
extended logistical system extremely vulnerable to destruc-
tion by large armored forces roaming freely deep in the
defender's rear areas.
When the force being attacked is unable to effect one of
the aforementioned classical forms of defense, it is obligated
to conduct some form of retrograde operation to avoid decisive
engagement and destruction in place. In the classical sense,
the doctrinal form of retrograde operation of interest is the
DELAY
.
The delay, by definition, is "A type of defensive operation
in which a force under pressure trades space for time while in-
flicting maximum punishment on the enemy without becoming de-
cisively engaged" [Ref. 5]. The delaying units fire at the ad-
vancing enemy at the maximum effective ranges of the organic
weapon systems, theoretically causing the attacker to deploy
his units to maneuver on the defender. This, ideally, creates
valuable time which the parent organization of the delaying
forces needs to constitute its main defense further to the
rear. To preclude piecemeal destruction of these delaying
units, they seek to withdraw to subsequent delay positions
before becoming decisively engaged. That is to say, before
the attacker can bring such a volume of fire to bear on the
delay position as to make the withdrawal virtually impossible.
Here, freedom of action is essential to exploit any discovered
situation which proves unfavorable to the enemy, to shift
forces, or make maximum use of the available terrain [Ref. 5].
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Technically speaking, therefore, the delay is keyed on the
availability of suitable terrain (delay positions) from which
long range observation and fire are afforded, and by which
covered and concealed withdrawal routes are provided to the
delaying units.
Incorporation of antitank guided missile systems augments
the capabilities of mechanized infantry to destroy attacking
armor. But it is readily apparent that current short and
medium range antiarmor weapons could seldom, effectively, be
brought to bear on armored targets, if the long range systems
have already given away the general location of the delay
position and enemy counterfires have been adjusted onto that
position.
To wait until the enemy is within range of the shorter
range systems is to risk attempting to engage deployed forces
moving under cover of massive supporting fires and using
covered and concealed attack routes, given immediately previous
long range AT system fires have alerted the enemy.
This problem would, of course, be compounded by seeking
to delay over defensive sector frontages initially greater
than five times those doctrinally acceptable for the area or
mobile defenses, under ideal circumstances .
In addition to force augmentation by antiarmor weapons
and STANO devices , the search has been on to find a viable
alternative tactic capable of effectively counteracting the




C. THE PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE TACTIC
One such tactic, the FORCE-ORIENTED DEFENSE (FOD) , has
been proposed by the staff and faculty of the United States
Infantry School, Fort Denning, Georgia: "The underlying
principle of the force-oriented defense is that the defender
offers a degree of resistence appropriate to the existing
combat power ratio . . . The objective is to create vulner-
abilities that can be exploited to gain maximum returns with
minimum expenditure of assets" [Ref. 6].
Unlike the delay, the FOD considers terrain only in the
context that it determines where the enemy will move his units,
and how it will facilitate destruction of those enemy units,
through the inherent obstacles, observation and fields of fire,
and cover and concealment it affords. The FOD also more
readily accepts the possibility of some of the defender's
units being bypassed (inadvertently or purposefully permitted)
,
with subsequent attacks by these bypassed units on elements of
the enemy force to the rear of the first or second attacking
echelons. Such attacks v/ould most likely come about as the
bypassed units moved to re-establish contact with the remainder
of their organizations, thus again seeking to position them-
selves ahead of the enemy's first echelon units [Ref. 7].
To test feasibility relative to current doctrine and
tactics, it is necessary to examine in detail only those as-
pects which are peculiar to the FOD concept and have a major
impact on discernible differences this concept may provide.
This permits the isolation of specific type engagements
for detailed analysis. Included, of course, are the pertinent
14
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interfacings these have with the .more universally employed
defensive tactics.
For example, in this study, long range ATGM engagements
of armored targets were of interest only in the manner in
which they bore on the effectiveness of mechanized infantry
antiarmor ambushes. That is to say, ATGM's can be employed
in relative isolation wherein the missiles are fired at maxi-
mum effective ranges, as soon as targets become available;
or, they can be held until the targets have entered a pre-
selected killing zone into which the maximum number of
missiles may be fired in a surprise salvo. The significance
here is that the second choice precludes piecemeal employment
of long range systems which, in turn, can be reacted upon
before medium and short range systems can be utilized. Note
that this does not preclude a simultaneous employment of the
long range systems elsewhere, under the first mode of
employment. In fact, the formulators of the FOD recognized
that, "Only our long-range antiarmor weapons, to include
aerial antiarmor platforms, should be used in those areas
which strongly favor massive and rapid armor thrusts, and in
those which offer scant cover and concealment for the
defender" [Ref. 6].
Conceptually, the FOD makes maximum use of small unit
antiarmor ambushes. Such a tactic would thus employ the
short and medium range antiarmor weapons in a manner which
makes optimal use of their armor-killing capabilities. It
should be recalled, however, that the FOD is not limited to
such ambushes. These are simply techniques more or less
15

unique to the FOD (when speaking of such a large-scale ap-
plication of such ambushes) . The general principle of re-
sistance appropriate to meet the existing combat power ratio
may require defending from a built-up area (urban areas being
major obstacles to armor) for a specified period of time for
example.
The particular tactic of interest, for detailed study, was
determined to be the small-unit antiarmor ambush. If, then,
the FOD makes maximum use of and derives a major portion of
its effect from such small-unit antiarmor ambushes, in order
for the FOD to be a feasible alternative tactical concept,
the following must be true:
1
.
The engagement exchange ratios and weapon attrition
rates must be favorable to the defender.
2. The defender must be able to achieve a density of
such ambushes between the point of initial enemy contact and
the location of the final, determined defense, as to cut the
combat power ratio down to within acceptable limits. (This
is usually interpreted to mean less than three-to-one,
attacker-to-defender.) Theoretically, then, with such a
combat power ratio, the defender may undertake one of the
more classical forms of defense. Inherent in this is the
assumption that the requisite density of ambush positions,
along the major identified enemy avenues of approach, are
available. The actual determination of position availability
was beyond the scope of this study.
A hypothetical situation will serve to illustrate the
exchange ratio/position density problem: Suppose a mechanized
16

infantry division, with normal attachments from Corps, is
faced by a combined arms army. Suppose, also, that the two
forces are organized as shown in Table I. Note that the com-
bat support units are listed together, this is for convenience
only. The normal detachments/attachments, direct support and
reinforcing missions as for a retrograde operation would be
employed [Refs. 7 and 8],
Now suppose, from the point of passage of the corps
covering force (normally an armored cavalry regiment) where
first contact may be expected between the enemy force and
the mechanized infantry division, the final defensive line
established by the corps commander for the forv/ard divisions
is 100 kilometers to the rear. Assuming a width of sector
of 45 to 60 kilometers for the division, one sees each of the
two forward mechanized brigades having attrition areas approxi-
mately 20 to 30 kilometers wide and 100 kilometers deep.
To calculate the requisite density of antiarmor ambushes,
some measure of relative combat power is necessary. A gross
approximation of the relative combat power of a tactical orga-
nization is its firepower potention (FPP) . It should be noted
that this is not an attempt to, in any way, justify the FPP
methodology. FPP scores were herein employed due to their
simplistic nature, purely for purpose of illustration. Since
exact values are not required for this illustration, it may
be presumed that the aggregated FPP scores can be represented
by the maximum possible scores attributable to a unit. This
presupposes that each unit will be employed in an optimal
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Applying such a methodology to the hypothetical defender
(BLUE) and attacker (RED) , FPP scores may be drawn from the
appropriate listings in Ref. 9. Example aggregate scores are
reflected in Table I.
It is readily seen that any attempt to reach a combat
power ratio less than 3:1, with BLUE having a supposed minimum
acceptable FPP of 18,200 at the point of final defense, would
require an attrition of more than 159,000 FPP points from RED.
Arbitrarily, let it be assumed that 75,000 points must be
attrited by small-unit antiarmor ambushes. If each ambush
were to average an attrition of six tanks (two Red-type
platoons) and three armored personnel carriers (equivalent,
when loaded with troops, to one motorized rifle platoon), the
loss to the Red force per engagement would be approximately
250 points. This, then, implies that 300 such ambushes need
be conducted before the Red force has advanced 100 kilometers.
With ambushes oriented only on identified avenues of approach
through the sector (keying on the observed usage of these
avenues by the enemy force) , the Blue commander may be faced
with the task of initiating an ambush every 20 square kilometers
A regimental avenue of approach five to eight kilometers wide
would then have to be ambushed, on the average, every two to
four kilometers along its potential 100 kilometer length.
If the terrain or forces available, given the assumptions
leading to the required density, were not adequate, the tactic,
as envisioned, would not be feasible. It becomes important,
therefore, that estimates of force exchange ratios and weapon
system attrition rates per engagement be determined. VJith
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such information, the commander may determine the feasibility
of employing this particular aspect (the antiarmor ambushes)
of the FOD.
With the foregoing in mind, a methodology for deriving
such exchange ratios and attrition rates is presented integral
to this study.
D. PREVIOUS ANALYSES OF THE PROPOSED CONCEPT
To the knowledge of the author, as of the preparation
of this study, the FOD has only been subjected to an exercis-
ing of the "JIFFY" manual wargame at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,
in 1971-1972, and periodic field simulations utilizing students
from the Infantry Officer Advanced Course at the United States
Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia. Additionally,
the FOD concept was sent to the other Army branch schools for
staffing during its formulation phases.
NOTE: These field exercises are run under the auspices
of the Defense Committee, Brigade and Battalion Operations
Department, USAID, and involve pitting two groups of vehicular-
mounted students against each other. One group acts as the
attacking Warsaw Pact-type Red armored force, moving along a
predetermined avenue of approach through the training area.
The other group simulates a force composed largely of ATOM
systems with a mission of conducting a Force Oriented Defense
in the assigned sector. Besides providing the students experi-
ence in selecting AT Gil firing positions and ambush killing
zones, the exercises have shown that the assumed Warsaw Pact-
type tactic of fast-moving column formations judgmentally re-
sults in more Red tank losses than the more cautious US rate.
Essence of conversation with LTC Joseph Keyes , Chairman,




II. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED TACTIC
A. A HIERARCHY OF MODELS
Prior to actually field testing a concept, some form of a
relatively cost-effective analytical study is normally taken.
Since the complexities of modeling a small-unit antiarmor am-
bush require more than a measure of effectiveness such as the
rate of FEBA movement or tons of ammunition expended per day
in support of troops in contact, one sees that a purely analytic
formulation of this concept will yield no tractable closed-
form solutions. This, then, leaves high resolution simulations.
It was recognized that some significant changes might be re-
quired to model the FOD small-unit antiarmor ambushes by such
high-resolution simulations as DYNTACS and CAR.MONETTE
.
In light of the foregoing, a base-case scenario, with a
set of realistic model-simplifying assumptions would act as a
first cut at the modeling problem; acting as a guide to the
simulation model formulators.
This study, then, has sought, through development and ex-
ercising of a manual war game, the derivation of both a base-
case methodology and suggested model-simplifying assumptions.
Although the model is quite simplified, it presents a means of
considering, sequentially, the critical events and situations
impacting on the battle outcome. These events and situations
include, but are not restricted to: Composition of forces;
formations and rates of movement; tactical plans and standard




To be of value, given the tactical situation and mission,
such a model should provide, as outputs, exchange ratios of
weapon systems or tactical organizations, weapon attrition
(kill) rates per type engagement, end-of-engagement disposi-
tions, and indications of whether or not a force appears to be
employing its optimal tactics. (Such outputs were secondary
objectives of this study.)
Realistic values for outputs, such as those enumerated
above, are not necessarily to be expected from the proposed
model in that the inputs employed were, in many cases, gross
approximations of or extrapolations from known data. This is
particularly the case as applies to Warsaw Pact-type weapon
system characteristics, and characteristics of classified US
antitank guided missile systems. (Although the foregoing
smacks of lacking in mathematical rigor, the reader is re-
minded that the main purpose of modeling is taken to be the
development of insight.) What is of use, therefore, is the
methodology employed, providing the framework into which up-
dated or classified versions of the data may be put and
exercised.
Since exercising the manual war game, involving random
number draws for determination of results at each step in
each engagement, required a great deal of time, the obvious
trends detected within the conflict simulation were extracted,
linked with the hit/kill probabilities, target acquisition
times, etc., and incorporated into an expected-value model.
The expected-value model was, in turn, exercised to derive the
exchange ratios, weapon attrition rates, and insight into the
22

optimality of the tactics employed.
The approach of using an expected- value war game allows,
more readily, a sensitivity analysis or complete parametric
study, as more situations, initial force levels, and battle
termination conditions may be exercised within the latter
form of the manual game, for the same effort expenditure.
B. SIMPLIFYING ASSUMPTIONS
Prior to development of the war games, and concurrent with
the first attempt at the scenario, a list of simplifying as-
sumptions was devised. The following list, by category,
reflects the basic initial assumptions. More specific ones,
as pertain to a specific weapon system, for example, are in-
corporated later in the study.
1 . Situational Assumptions
a. A non-nuclear limited-general or general warfare
environment.
b. Central-European-type terrain.
c. No basic changes in the political policies of the
governments concerned.
d. Mo near-future improvements, from the defender's
point of view, in the current force imbalances.
e. A general air-parity exists with Red having a
slight advantage. Either side can gain local air superiority
for short periods of time.
f. Red has launched his armor-heavy offensive, with
little warning to Blue; the implication being that the only




g. The equivalent of a Red combined-arms army attacks
each Blue forward mechanized infantry division; the assumed
approximate combat power ratio being seven-to-one (7:1).
2 . Organizational Assumptions
a. Red Units
(1) Basic organization is as reflected in Refs. 4
and 5 and Table I.
(2) Exceptions to (1), above, are the incorporation
of Soviet-type armored equipment into the tables of organization.
The T-G2 (main battle tank) , the BMP- 7 6 (armored infantry combat
vehicle) , the BRDM (amphibious scout car and ATGM launch
vehicle), and the 85mm (ATAP) replace the 100mm medium tank,
APC 3, APC 4, and 57mm (ATAP), respectively.
(3) Two BRDM per motorized rifle battalion are
configured as ATGM launch vehicles, mounting the "SAGGER"
missile.
(4) One BMP-76 per motorized rifle platoon has a
SAGGER missile mounted on a launch rail above its 7 6mm smooth-
bore gun.
(5) Red units are at full organizational strength
at the beginning of each ambush.
b. Blue Units
(1) Basic organization is as per the K-series
Table of Organization and Equipment [Ref. 10].
(2) Antiarmor weapon system augmentations and
replacement have given each mechanized infantry battalion 27




(3) Each of the mechanized infantry divisions has
one tank battalion equipped with the M6 0A2 main battle tank,
which mounts the 152mm gun-launcher (-firing the A2(M) ATGII
or the 15 2mm HE round) .
3 . Doctrinal and Tactical Assumptions
a. Red Units
(1) The Red force units attempt to move at an
average speed of 15 kilometers per hour, in regimental column
formations, accepting exposed flanks so as to achieve a rapid,
deep penetration to the rear of the Blue main defense forces.
(2) Mobile regimental artillery is positioned
close behind the attacking echelons, having a response time
to targets of opportunity of from three to five minutes.
(3) Individual tank crev/s in Red tank platoons
will normally engage the same targets engaged by their respective
platoon leaders unless they detect a high threat target requir-
ing immediate counter- action [Ref. 11].
(4) Red motorized rifle units will prefer to re-
main mounted in their BMP-7G's, firing from firing ports in
the sides of the vehicles, thus ensuring maintenance of the
momentum of the attack. They will dismount only when necessary
to remove or destroy obstacles, barriers, or dug-in enemy
forces
.
(5) Main gun fire from BMP-76's will be employed
in the same manner as in (3), above.
(6) When engaging tanks or other armored fighting
vehicles at ranges beyond 500 meters, the BMP-76's will halt
to fire their main guns. Engaging close-range targets and
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personnel , the BMP-7 6's will fire either main gun or coax MG,
while advancing to close with the target,
b. Blue Units
(1) Due to high vulnerability of helicopters to
AAA systems, employment of helicopters as AT systems are re-
stricted to raids on highly lucrative massed armor targets
such as assembly or staging areas rear of the enemy lines; or,
held in general reserve to be employed as part of armor-heavy
counterattacks of deep armor penetrations. The latter to be
the case, especially where the enemy tanks have outdistanced,
or otherwise become separted from, DS AAA weapons and armored
infantry units.
(2) Due to limited combat and combat support
resources and extended defensive sector frontages, mechanized
infantry divisions will employ the Force-Oriented Defense,
making maximum use of reinforced mech infantry platoon antiarmor
ambushes
.
(3) Long range ATGM fires are used to attrit the
enemy force, maintain contact with the enemy's first echelon
units, and draw those units into the killing zones of the
small-unit antiarmor ambushes. (See Ref. 12 for a detailed
discussion of such tactics by the Soviet armed forces as part
of their antiarmor warfare.)
(4) Due to sparsity of friendly troops to their
front and lack of massed mutually supporting fires, artillery
units are positioned between one-third and two-thirds of their
maximum effective ranges ahead of the first-echelon enemy units
or rearward of the foremost friendly units , whichever is the
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lesser distance [Ref. 8].
(5) Due to firepower superiority of the Red
artillery, and presumed responsiveness to counter-battery fire
missions by the Red artillery, the Blue artillery batteries
normally displace after the equivalent of, at maximum, a 72-
round battery volley (-one fire mission)
.
(6) Maximum use of artillery and mortar antiarmor
ambushes is employed. (See Ref. 13 for an historical account
of devastatingly effective Soviet artillery ambush of elements
of four German panzer and motorized infantry divisions.)
4 . Scenario Assumptions
a. Suitable ambush killing zones are available v/hich
afford a maximum capability to simultaneously detect multiple
armored targets at ranges up to 3,000 meters for the ATGM
systems in the ambush force.
b. Unless forced by the situation to do otherwise,
the antiarmor ambush would not be executed on Red recon units
of five vehicles or less.
c. The ambush force (a reinforced mech infantry
platoon) achieves surprise, being undetected by Red recon
units or first echelon attack forces until its initial rounds
are fired. (This presupposes that detection of the ambush
force elements by the Red recon unit would result in exchanges
of fire such that the recon unit would be the force ambushed.
It is assumed that the Blue ATGM systems would track the recon
force vehicles until they had completed passage of the killing




d. Blue communications is effective to the point that
an ambush warning order can be relayed approximately 30 seconds
before the ambush order is given, and can be received by all
elements
.
e. Intervisibility is such that initial hand-off s are
completely effective and all ATGM systems can engage their
initial assigned targets within five seconds of the end of the
order to open fire; this order being given by the mech platoon
leader.
f. If any Red vehicle detects the launch of an ATGM
at it, it will attempt evasive action and will immediately
begin the process of engaging the ATGM, unless already in the
process of engaging another high-priority target.
g. The infantry portion of the ambush force will
place its vehicles in covered and concealed positions (relative
to the Red force) to the rear of the ambush position and near
enough to allow the platoon to be mounted and moving in less
than three minutes from the start of the ambush at t=0
seconds.
h. The Blue tanks will be positioned to both partici-
pate in the antiarmor ambush and provide covering fires to the
withdrawing mech infantry platoon (which has no tank-killing
capability while moving, the armored personnel carriers being
armed with caliber .50 machine guns [Ref. 8]).
i. The Blue tanks with HAWs will continue to engage
the ambushed enemy force until the mech platoon is clear, or
effective counter-fire is generated from the Red force.
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j. Each ATGM system must be stationary throughout
the target engagement process until the missile impacts in
order to achieve any reasonable probability of a hit. (Any




k. Due to the general lack of opportunity to register
targets in the ambush area, Blue artillery would bo on call
with the target area being the approximate position of the Red
battalion second echelon units.
1. The Blue mechanized platoon has a quick-fire radio
channel to the company's attached 4.2 inch mortar platoon and
the battalion's direct support 155mm howitzer battery.
m. The Blue mech platoon will remain in firing posi-
tions approximately 30 seconds after initiation of the ambush,
engaging as many Red AFV's as possible in that time. (A first
estimate of the maximum allowable time before the Red AFV's
can begin to bring effective fire to bear.)
n. The Blue dismounted withdrawal rate averages 10 km/h
and the mounted rate is 15 km/h.
o. The Red tank battlesight ammunition is not fixed,
and for initial convenience was assumed to be the appropriate
type round to best kill the type target engaged in each case.
(That is HVAPDS (FS) rounds were fired at all AFV's, and HEAT
(FS) rounds were fired at all personnel and dismounted ATGM
targets
.
p. Due to differences in required superelevations
and firing ignition circuits, simultaneous engagement of targets
by the main gun, coax MG, or mounted ATGM from the same AFV
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are assumed to be impossible in this study.
q. Blue sniper fire is employed to the maximum extent
possible in the ambushes to kill AFV commanders and drivers,
or otherwise limit the commanders 1 abilities to detect and ac-
quire targets and observe the battlefield. (See Ref. 12 for
an excellent discussion of sniper and machine gun fire in
Soviet antiarmor ambush tactics.)
C. DATA DEVELOPMENT
1 . Requirements
In undertaking the development of the manual v;ar game
inherent to this study, it became apparent that, the important
characteristics of all the systems to be modeled had to be
determined. Important characteristics were determined to be
those which affected the course of the battle during the period
considered. The implication here, for example, is that the
fuel capacities of vehicles were not considered important due
to the relatively short projected duration of each antiarmor
ambush. On the other hand, all events and times involved in
the target engagement processes were felt to be of importance.
Similarly, system characteristics which determined short-term
mobility, survivability, reliability, and target hit/kill
capability were also critical.
To maintain simplicity in the model, the inherent mobility
of each vehicle was assumed to provide a constant speed of
15 km/h. Survivability was assumed assured against small arms
fire for all AFVs (to include external trappings) as this is
an example of extreme-casing the solution - any effect result-
ing could then be judgmentally applied as a bonus to the firer,
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but. the exact effect would be indeterminable. Similarly, near
misses with high explosive-type rounds were assumed to have
only suppressive effects; the fragment damage to antennae,
vision blocks, fording equipment, etc., being, again, bonus
effects which would be contingent upon future events outside
of the engagement in question.
A further simplification was the assumption that all
systems were completely reliable throughout the battle, unless
they were mobility-, firepower-, or catastrophic-killed.
a. Critical Event Times
In a two-sided battle such as the antiarmor
ambush, the critical event times were felt to be times for
target detections, target acquisitions, and target engagements.
These included response/reaction times, weapon load times,
system aiming times, system displacement times, target hand-off
times, projectile flight times, and time delays caused by judg-
mentally applied indecision or suppression.
Since the distributions of all such times were not known,
best estimates and, in several cases, gross approximations had
to be found.
b. Hit Probabilities
As assumed under paragraph C, above, except for
personnel and ground-mounted ATGMs , targets required projectile
impact to be considered hit (-for other than judgmentally
applied suppressive effects) . The individual system hit
probabilities are greatly system, target, and situationally
dependent. Since few of the characteristics of Warsaw Pact-
type systems or US classified ATGM systems are available, or
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may be incorporated into an unclassified study, best unclassi-
fied estimates had to be found. In several cases, gross
extrapolations from assumed similar systems or results of
experiments were used.
c. Conditional Kill Probabilites
Normally, given a target hit by an antiarmor
projectile, some damage will result. The amount of target
damage or type kill was assumed to fall into one of the cate-
gories of kills: Mobility, firepower, catastrophic, or
mobility-union-firepower. Since it is theoretically possible
for an armored target to be hit and sustain no appreciable
damage, such a hit was presumed to have had some suppressive
effect. This suppression, whether it was in the form of a
loss in mobility, firepower, or missile control; or, it caused
a time-delay in the target's own target engagement process;
was, judgmentally applied, taking into consideration the
situation and systems involved. Any hit which did not result
in at least a mobility-union-firepcwer (MUF)-kill, was assumed
to fall into this suppression category.
The type of kill, given a hit, is a function of target
armor characteristics, projectile penetration or spalling
effect, angle of incidence to the armor (vertically), and
attack angle (horizontally) . (Combined within armor character-
istics is the inherent standoff distance provided by external
trappings or standoff plates.)
Due to the approximations necessary to determine basic
hit probabilities, it was felt there would be little sense in
computing conditional kill probabilities for each set of
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angles, impact points, and weapon-target ranges. For simpli-
city of computation and comparison, average conditional kill
probabilities, by category, were sought. Again, extrapolations
from known or estimates values were used wherever necessary.
2. Sources and Procedures
a. Critical Event Times
Research has revealed some pertinent unclassified
studies and experimental results which have produced data
directly applicable to this study, with only minor modifica-
tions required. The sequence of The Tank V'eapon System reports
prepared by the Systems Research Group, Department of Industrial
Engineering, The Ohio State University, have addressed the
target engagement process times for main battle tanks [Refs.
14, 15 and 1G] . Other pertinent data sources were the Combat
Operations Research Group's Reference Handbook: Weapon Effec -
tiveness Data, Part III (Vleapon Data ), Volumes I and II [Ref.
17] ; the US Army Combat Developments Experimentation Command
report: Tactical Effectiveness Testing of Antitank Missiles
[Ref. 18] ; the US Army Europe Pamphlet No. 30-60-1, Part One ,
Volumes I and II [Ref s. 19 and 20]; and, the International
Defense Review series on "The Modern Battle Tank" [Refs. 21
and 22] .
Specific references employed are listed in Appendix A with
the appropriate algorithms, tables, figures, or discussions of
same.
An example of the time distribution derivations is Case
I,A,1, from Tab 2 to Appendix A. This is the case of T-62
engagement of M60A2 or HAW with aimed fire, moving firer/
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stationary target, first round (IIVAPDS (FS)). Here one sees
the general equation for time to projectile impact is a modifi-
cation of that equation presented in Ref. 15. The detection
times were assumed to be truncated exponentials, as shown, and
the times of projectile flight were extrapolated from data on
US and Soviet weapon systems presented in Refs. 17 and 22.
The remaining times were assumed to be uniformly distributed,
with ranges judgmentally derived. (Note that graphical de-
rivations of the distributions of the maximums of pertinent
time distributions are presented in Figs. 2 through 11.)
For purposes of incorporation within the manual war game
using the "Monte Carlo" method [Ref. 23] , random numbers were
drawn and the appropriate values were marked on the cumulative
distribution functions (CDF) of the appropriate critical time
distributions. The corresponding points on the time axis were
then read from the downward projections of the indicated points
on the curves of the distributions. These, then, were graphi-
cal solutions to the inverse CDFs used to determine realizations
of the random variables of interest. Inherently assumed, then,
is the existence of inverse functions for all the CDFs utilized.
On the other hand, for the expected value approach, only
the derived mean values of the distributions were used. For
the case in question, above, the expected time to engage is
15.5 seconds if the T-62 detects the ATGM launch, or 23.5
seconds if the target is handed-off from another observer.
(Note that all pertinent mean times are listed according to





The references listed under paragraph 2a, above,
were used in addition to several Eallistic Research Laboratory
memorandum reports and a Report on Effectiveness of HE Fire
from Tank-Mounted Weapons prepared by the Battelle Memorial
Institute [Ref. 24]. These and other specific references are,
as in paragraph 2a, above, listed within the appropriate
algorithms, tables, figures, etc., in Appendix A.
An example of the data extrapolation used for the Soviet-
type weapon systems follows from the assumption that the 115mm
HVAPDS (FS) round, fired with a muzzle velocity of 1,60 m/sec
[Ref. 21] from the T-62 main battle tank, will have ballistic
characteristics similar to the T320 APFSDS round. The T320
has a muzzle velocity of 5,200 ft/sec, a ballistic coefficient
of 1.712, and is classed as a type-2 projectile [Ref. 25,
Appendix A], To derive the hit probabilities, the appropriate
tables in Ref. 25 were entered using an assumed round-to-
round dispersion of 0.6 mils. This, in turn, was taken from
the discussion of 115mm HVAPDS accuracy in Ref. 22, and the
related M60 APDS dispersion in Ref. 17.
The effect of firing while moving, with a vertically-
stabilized main gun, is approximated from estimates shown in
Refs. 22, 26 and 27. The characteristic shapes of the hit
probability curves were then assumed being based on a few
known or estimated points.
Similarly, ATGM hit probabilities, conditioned on main-
tenance of line-of-sight with the target, were drawn from
discussions and figures presented in Refs. 28 and 29.
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c. Conditional Kill Probabilities
In all cases, conditional kill probabilities were
judgmentally applied extrapolations from estimates for anti-
armor munitions presented in Ref. 17. The judgmental deter-
minations were based on relative approximate ratios of
vulnerable-to-presented areas, armor characteristics, weapon-
target ranges (for kinetic energy rounds only) , and locations
of vehicular-mounted weapon systems.
The value of the P(MUF: SSH) was taken to be:




The initial formulation of the scenario upon which the manual
war game employing both the Monte Carlo methodology and the expected-
value approach is based, is shown in Appendix A, Tab 1. The general
situation and force organizations were modified versions of the class-
room exercise (BG1C/M30) presented to the Infantry Officer Advanced
Courses at the U. S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia
[Ref. 4]. The Red and Blue tactics were based on the assumptions
listed in Part II, B, of this study, being derived largely from Ref-
erences 4-7, 11, 12 and 28-32.
A. MANUAL WAR GAME
From experience gained through instruction on and use of the
AIR BATTLE ANALYZER, developed by the Applied Physics Labora-
tory of The Johns Hopkins University for the Department of the Navy,
Bureau of Naval Weapons, possible techniques for simultaneously
maneuvering and creating engagements for multiple vehicles and weapon
systems were suggested. A maneuvering board consisting of a com-
posite Range-Azimuth Plot and a Range- Time Plot were made on a
scale of one inch = 500 meters. The time scale ran from to 270
seconds. With such a plotting system, it is possible to graphically
solve time- space relationships, as vertical projections onto the Range-
Time Plot automatically transform relative motion problems in the
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two spatial dimensions of the Range-Azimuth Plot, into the two
dimensions of space and time on the Range-Time Plot.
Given such a plotting system, it then becomes a simple matter
to keep track of individual vehicle or unit movements, thus allowing
rapid estimates of weapon-target ranges or intervisibilities (assuming
that some form of overlay has been prepared which reflects the
scenario's assumed intervisibilities). [Ref. 33 and Figure l]
To preserve some form of realism, allowing the Red tanks to
attempt some form of evasive maneuver when each detected the launch
of an ATGM at it, small areas of vegetation or terrain contours were
assumed to exist, within the areas of intervisibility. Due to the com-
plexity of trying to model such line-of-sight factors, continuously,
these small areas were not held fixed. It was assumed that the ATGMs
were positioned and the killing zone was chosen so as to maximize
the existing intervisibilities. The effect of evasive maneuvers and
normal breaks in line-of-sight due to the vegetation and slight terrain
contours were handled by using the results of experimental data given
in Reference 18, pages 4-9.
It was assumed that the sample experimental results applied in
the scenario. Therefore, for example, the probability that line-of-
sight was not broken over an ATGM time of flight of t seconds was
computed to be l-P(BLOS), where P(BLOS) is read from the vertical
axis of Figure 16, entering on the horizontal axis with the value t.
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For bookkeeping purposes, and to retain the sequential ordering
of events, several forms were created based on critical event times.
This enabled the recording and examination of only significant inter-
actions of the systems involved to be accomplished in an efficient
manner. For simplicity, event times were rounded to the nearest
tenth of a second. Even at this, the Monte Carlo form of the manual
game took an inordinately long period of time to run. The forms
employed are shown in Appendix A.
An example of the procedure is found by examining the TIME-
HISTORY forms. Here, the events were entered by chronological
sequencing, the times being determined by the factors leading to
time-to-engage or time-to-impact of projectile. As systems were
judgmentally brought into play, the sequencing procedure of events
immediately followed from the required actions of all interfacing
systems. (The foregoing was, of course, based on the initial assump-
tions as reflected in Part II, B, of this study. )
The requirement to establish an orderly process for repeated
computations of engagement results led to the development of several
algorithms. The algorithms were arranged according to weapon sys-
tems, targets, and types of engagement. For example, Algorithm III
(Tab 2 to Appendix A) was used whenever an ATGM system engaged an
AFV;Algorithm IV was for LAW and M-79 fire at AFVs); Algorithm V
was used for AFV main gun fire at personnel and ground-mounted
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crew-served weapons (to include MAW); and so on. (Note that specific
references and assumptions pertaining to the development of each
algorithm are listed with same. )
By examination of the algorithms, one sees the interaction with
the scenario diagram plotted on the maneuvering board, the TIME-
HISTORY form, the engagement result forms, and the applicable
figures and tables. It is this interaction, plus the judgmental deter-
mination of realistic tactics based on the assumptions listed in Part II,
B, of this study, which is the manual game. The algorithms indicate
the points at which random numbers are drawn when employing the
"Monte Carlo" methodology.
As an example of the above- stated methodology, assume that
prior to time t = seconds, the MAW in the 3rd Squad, M , has been
3
given BMP-76 number 11a as its target. This implies that Algorithm
III (ATGM Engagement of AFVs:Resulting P^.) ajjplies: Since this is
the first round for M , and sufficient warning was given to complete
target hand-off, there is no need to first employ ALGORITHMS I and II.
Assume M has completed its detection, identification, and localization
and will fire (engage) at t-2 seconds (assuming a slight reaction time
delay following the order to fire at t=0). From the scenario diagram
plotted on the maneuvering board M has a range to 11a of 300 meters,
at t=2, and an assumed constant ATGM velocity of 200 meters per




of 300/200 = 1. 5 sec. Its time-to-impact, which indicates this engage-
ment's placement on the list of critical events on the TIME-HISTORY
form is 2 + 1. 5 = 3. 5 sec.
Step 3 of Algorithm III yields, from Figure 15, a P(SSH:BLOS) =
.86. P(E:P(SSH:BLOS), in Step 4, is assumed to be 1.0, as this was
an assigned target.
At t = 3. 5 seconds, the engagement is reentered on the TIME-
HISTORY form, assuming no intervening event has caused the destruc-
tion or suppression of either M or 11a.
3
Step 5: Using the time-of-flight of 1.5 sec, Figure 16 is entered
to determine that P(BLOS)=0. 02. Therefore, P(BLOS)= l-P(BLOS) =
0.98.
Step 6: P(SSH) = P(SSH:BLOS)P(BLOS) = (. 86)(. 98) = . 843 by
unconditioning.
Step 7: Assuming that the first random number drawn is less
than or equal to . 843, a hit is recorded. (If there were no hit, the
ATGM would begin a re-engagement process wherein the times to
detect and engage, given detection, would be determined from
ALGORITHMS I and II, respectively. At this point, the algorithm
would begin again. )
Step 9: In Table III, the pertinent conditional-kill probabilities
are found. Following a random number draw (from a table of random
numbers such as found in Ref. 34), a comparison is made such that
the category of kill closest to being greater than or equal to the
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random number is the type kill achieved. Suppose the random number
is .9803. Since this is greater than all of the categories listed under
BMP- 76 in Table III, for the MAW type ATGM, the judgmental applica-
tion of a degree of suppression would be made in the manner discussed
in Part II, paragraph C. 1. c, of this study. If, on the other hand, the
random number were .7201, a firepower-kill would be recorded and
BMP- 76 number 11a would be assumed mobility- suppressed for 30
seconds, in addition to being unable to engage targets for the remainder
of the battle. (Note, by being mobility-suppressed, 11a is now an
easier target for other weapon systems. By convention, however, M
begins a new detection and engagement process, having achieved a
significant kill on 11a. )
B. EXPECTED-VALUE MODEL
By contrast, an expected-value approach is a much- simplified
version of the manual game. By examination of the expected value
algorithms in Appendix A, Tab 2, one sees that no random numbers
are drawn. The values used are always the mean, or expected, values
of the time distributions concerned. The hit probabilities are read
directly, and the conditional kill probabilities are computed, weighted
by these hit probabilities. At this point, fractional kills on the target




For example, if the same situation were posed as in paragraph A
above, the conditional fractional kills, by category, from Table III,
would be M= .95, F= .75, C= . 72, MUF= .98. From Figures 15 and
16, P(SSH) would again be = . 843. Now, the fractional kills, by cate-
gory, for M against 11a, would be M=(. 95)(. 843)= . 80, F=(. 75) (. 843) =
. 632, and so on.
Also note that the engagement results recording forms have been
modified for the expected-value type of fractional kills.
Here, now, 11a may engage M or any other target, but its com-
3
bat effectiveness has been reduced such that its kill probabilities are
degraded to 1- .632 = .368 times their normal values, to account for
the previous engagement results. This suggests the only complicated
portion of this approach, fractional kills from multiple engagements
of the same target. The rule is that kills are only awarded relative
to the fraction of combat effectiveness the target possessed at the
beginning of the engagement. For example, achievement of a fire-
power kill of . 5 against a target which was only at a residual fire-
power effectiveness of . 6, due to having been F_killed at . 4 on a
previous engagement, would result in an awarding of a fractional kill
of . 3 to the second weapon system. And, the taget would now have a
residual firepower effectiveness (% F) of . 3.
The reader will note that the expected-value methodology, as
presented, is between the straight deterministic approach and a
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stochastic manual simulation. The straight deterministic, analytic
approach was ruled out as an approach for this study due to the com-
plexity of the scenario, combat dynamics, and possible objective func-
tion which would result from this mxn, heterogeneous force structure.
(Note, for this conflict, breakpoints are not modeled since Blue has
a specified time of withdrawal, and Red is assumed, doctrinally, to
push forces until expended, and then commit new forces through. )
On the other hand, the complete manual stochastic simulation is
too time consuming and does not lend itself to reiteration, that is




IV. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION OF MODEL EXERCISES
A. THE "MONTE CARLO" MANUAL WAR GAME
Although exercising the manual game was a very time consuming
task, it provided a framework for analysis of variations to aspects of
the proposed tactical concept and allowed the development of model
logic for further, detailed modeling and analysis.
1. The results, although greatly scenario-dependent, could
readily be generalized to give insight into the feasibility or optimality
of the tactics employed.
a. The high initial kill rate inflicted on the RED force in
the first seconds of the battle was offset in large measure as the
RED force systems were brought into play, building a higher volume
of fire than that possible from the defender. (See APPENDIX A,
TAB 3, ENCLOSURE a. ) Recall that the ambush techniques inherent
to the FOD require that disengagement be possible before the RED
forces can react. If this is not possible, this aspect of the tactical
concept fails.
b. The initially set requirement for the mechanized infantry
platoon to remain in the ambush positions until the ambush had been in
progress for 30 seconds, resulted in one of the rifle squads being
engaged by a RED tank while the squad was mounted and moving in
its armored personnel carrier. At the point of interest, there was
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no antiarmor system available to preclude the tank's engagement of
and destruction of the rifle squad and its APC, at t= 156 seconds.
Recall that the 30 second ambush time limit was set, based on the
initial assumption that it would be 30 seconds before the RED force
could begin to bring effective counterambush fires to bear (assuming
that a tank could get a maximum of two main gun rounds fired in this
period of time). NOTE: This same time limit was re-examined in
the expected-value game in order to check the results; and, was
found to yield roughly the same results, although this action was
extrapolated to, beyond the point of actual game termination.
c. Main gun fire from BMP_76s, while moving, had little
effect on the BLUE force; but when they halted to fire at armored
targets, by the third rounds they were achieving casualty production.
d. Although artillery fires were not explicitly played, the
battle results would have been virtually the same for the forces in the
ambush force and the RED first echelon force caught in the killing
zone. This was the case because the BLUE artillery would have been
adjusted on the RED battalion's second echelon units to inhibit their
effectiveness in engaging the BLUE force by fire or maneuvering on
that force in its ambush positions or during its withdrawal. The
RED artillery was assumed to have a three to five minute delay time,
and, as such, was the basis for the decision that all BLUE elements
be mounted and moving prior to t= 180 seconds.
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2. Structure- wise the manual game is complicated in that it
requires the simultaneous manipulation of several forms, figures,
tables, and a plotting board. But this form has the advantage of being
modular in nature, allowing the easy substitution of classified system
characteristics or known critical event time distributions where
herein they may have been assumed, based on intuition alone.
3. Some of the simplifying assumptions do provide what may
eventually prove to be great breaks with reality; for example, the
whole effectiveness of the ambush technique presupposes an ability
to avoid detection by the attacking force until the initial rounds are
fired. Another implicit assumption is that the RED AFVs could
conduct evasive maneuvers from the BLUE ATGMs, while initiating
counter-engagement procedures. This may seem to be contradictory
in nature, but it was assumed that such could somehow be effected.
B. THE EXPECTED- VALUE MANUAL WAR GAME
Due to the form of some of the critical event time distributions,
use of the mean value to represent the expected value slightly biases
the times toward the longer values. This is the case with non-
symmetrical distributions such as the exponential, wherein more
than 50% of the observed values will be less than the mean. For this
reason, the distributions for other than the uniform random variables
were plotted, and, in some cases, graphically derived, so that the
user could use median values, if such were the choice. (See
47

APPENDIX A, TAB 2, ENCLOSURE b. ) Note that some of the critical
event distributions were modified during research and development of
the expected-value game; therefore, pairwise comparison of game
results, except where the comparison is obvious, is not recommended.
1. The BLUE force achieved a significantly favorable force
exchange ratio of 8. 75:1 during the initial 16. 3 seconds of the battle,
but this advantage rapidly deteriorated to 2. 7:1 at the original mech-
anized infantry platoon withdrawal time of t= 30 seconds, and was
down to 1. 6:1 when the game was terminated at t= 40. 5. The next
time of possible RED system attrition would have been at t= 54. 3,
while many RED system firings were scheduled in the first few sec-
onds after game termination.
2. The values of the exchange ratios listed in paragraph 1,
above, are dependent upon the weights assigned to the various systems
examined. Although the weightings were judgmentally determined,
they are similar to the most widely used modeling tool for measuring
combat power: firepower potential scores. The actual weights used
were judgmental modifications, by the author, of firepower potential
scores, as listed in Reference 9, and an unclassified version of the
standard weapon system weightings employed in the Weapon Effective-
ness Indices /Weighted Unit Values methodology. (See TABLE VI.)
[Refs. 35 and 36]
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3. With the exception of the significant kills achieved on the
MAWs, the greatest single BLUE attrition factor was the fire of the
two BMP-76s in the first echelon armed with SAGGER ATGMs. (Note
the large increases in the cumulative losses at t= 32. 4 and 37. 8 on
Figure 28. )
4. Removal of the two high MAW losses and the RED ATGM
kills reduces the locus of points for the BLUE force in Figure 28 to
a relatively constant slope (loss rate) which reaches a maximum at
t= 40.5 of 45.493 points. This implies a resultant exchange ratio of
approximately four-to-one. Such removal would be accomplished by
early engagement of the RED ATGM launch vehicles and an earlier
withdrawal of the BLUE infantry elements.
5. An attractive feature of positioning the HAW and M60A2 at
greater ranges than exercised in this model is shown by the following:
Extending the range of initial engagement from 2000 to 2500 meters
causes the P(C-Kill)s on T-62s of (. 92)(. 7)(. 6)= . 386 for the HAW,
and (. 92)(. 65)(. 55)= .329 for the M60A2, to be decreased to . 363 and
.320, respectively; whereas, the T-62's P(C-Kill) onanAPC_size
target will decrease from . 028 (on the first round, while moving)
to virtually zero since it is questionable if the kinetic energy round
would penetrate the required depth of armor at extreme ranges [Ref.
2l]> given that it did hit. This range extension then offsets the in-
creased relative superiority in rate of fire which the RED AFV
possesses. (Note, the RED gun systems may continue to fire at
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approximately the same rate, while the BLUE ATGMs have an





V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
1. Given the validity of the scenario assumptions relative to
tactics, and the appropriateness of the critical event time distributions,
the tactic of having the mechanized infantry platoon continue engaging
targets until t= 30 seconds is not feasible as it results in losses to the
infantry force and requires that the M60A2s and HAWs initially engage
the RED tanks which are the highest threats to the infantry in this
situation, and continue to do so until the infantry force has disengaged.
This, in turn, results in higher loss rates for these systems as the
RED ATGM launch vehicles are left unengaged and capable, in turn, of
engaging and killing the BLUE ATGM systems.
2. In line with an earlier infantry disengagement, at around
t= 5 to 10 seconds, the BLUE ATGMs should have as their first
priority, the destruction of the overwatching RED ATGM launch
vehicles.
3. In order to preclude RED armor maneuvering on the
withdrawing infantry before they can completely disengage, the
M60A2s must be in positions which afford observation and fire in the
vicinity of the infantry routes of withdrawal. This might necessitate
displacement after the first few rounds into the killing zone, in order
to reach such overwatch positions.
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4. The RED ATGM launch vehicles in the first echelon force
are the greatest threat to the M60A2s and the HAWs, therefore, these
must be engaged and destroyed early in the battle. This then allows
more flexibility in the engagement of the other RED AFVs.
5. The placement of weapon systems in the ambush positions
was critical to the determination of when to withdraw the mechanized
infantry platoon, and when to displace the reinforcing ATGMs. Trade-
offs exist between longer engagement times and longer ranges of
engagement.
6. There was a trade-off relative to the suppressive effects
versus kill probabilities for the main gun versus machine gun fire
from the RED BMP-76s at personnel and ground-mounted, crew-served
weapons. The advisability of firing the unstabilized 76mm smooth-
bore gun from the halt at long range armor targets was suggested due
to the low single shot hit probability achieved when firing on the move.
On the other hand, the possible increased suppressive effect of the
coaxially- mounted machine gun in engaging closer personnel targets
was suggested, given that it was assumed the BMP_76s will attempt
to close with the enemy infantry as qviickly as possible.
7. Modeling the ambush engagement in isolation of supporting
artillery fires was assumed to be permissible due to the lack of
utilization of such fires directly within the killing zone, within the
first three-to-five minutes of the battle. For this reason, the results
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of each ambush may be analyzed in isolation, but may not be carried
forward to the next engagement until the expected effects of supporting
fires from both sides are incorporated. This analysis applies only to
the gaining of additional modeling insight, since accurate determination
of exchange ratios and loss rates must include the effects of supporting
fires.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
It is recommended that the manual war games be utilized and
modified, as necessary, by military personnel in the combat arms
to further explore tactical restraints required under varied scenario
conditions such as increasing the density of RED ATGM systems in
the first echelon, altering the initial engagement ranges, or changing
the orders of battle.
It is further recommended that the modeling assumptions be
examined by personnel involved in high resolution simulations of the





THE MANUAL WAR GAME
This appendix presents the component parts of the manual game
as it was developed. Figure 1 reflects the base-case scenario dis-
position of forces at the time of initiation of the ambush. Note that the
weapon-target ranges are measured from center mass of each symbol
used.
To further present, as concisely as possible, the base-case
scenario as it was exercised, the appendix includes pertinent extracts
of the exercise reflected on the type record forms used.
TAB 1 (The Manual Game: Procedures and Rules) to this
appendix sets the stage and initiates the sequencing of the game.
TAB 2 (Elements of the Manual Game) to this appendix provides
the pertinent critical event time distributions, figures and tables of
hit probabilities and conditional kill probabilities, and the algorithms
with which critical event times and engagement results are determined.
TAB 3 (Analysis of Exercise Results) to this appendix includes
the aforementioned sample record forms, on which are reflected
some of the engagement results, in order to clarify the analysis and
the methodology employed.



































































1. Select an appropriate order of battle for both RED and
BLUE.
2. Given an ambush killing zone at least 1000 meters in
diameter, position the ambush force and determine appropriate zones
of intervisibility
.
3. Select appropriate formations for the RED first and second
echelon forces.
4. Place the RED force, in these formations, with the first
echelon unit in the killing zone.
5. Assuming an ambush initiation order given, judgmentally
assign firing times to all BLUE weapon systems (abort those, such
as LAW or M-79, which may have P(SSH)s which are too low) within
the first five seconds.
6. Enter the appropriate algorithms to begin the target engage-
ment processes. (See TAB 2, this appendix. )
7. Record on FORMA (TIME -HIS TORY) the calculated impact
times for each engagement. As these times become the next critical
events, re-enter the engagement on FORM A, compute and record the
engagement results. (Round all times to the nearest tenth of a second. )
8. Judgmentally bring each system, on both sides, into play
in as realistic a manner as possible. As each begins its target
detection and target engagement process, the sequence of critical
event times is automatically generated.
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9. Use the TIME-HISTORY form to keep track of the next
critical events.
10. Remove BLUE systems to covered and concealed positions
as they become mobility or firepower-killed. (For the expected-value
game, this is begun when the cumulative fractional catastrophic kill
reaches or exceeds . 50, or the MUF-kill on any one hit is greater
than or equal to . 75. )
11. Begin withdrawal of BLUE mech infantry platoon weapon
systems and personnel at or before t= 30 seconds. The only exception
is for a MAW gunner who has launched his missile prior to t = 30; in
which case, withdrawal for that gunner would begin immediately
following missile impact.
12. Withdrawing personnel will be moved by the most direct
route at 10 km/h to the APCs. Load time for the APCs is assumed
to be 15 seconds.
13. Keep track of all current positions through plotting move-
ments on the scenario diagram (maneuvering board).
14. Judgmentally terminate the engagements when the BLUE
mech infantry platoon is mounted and moving, or prior to t= 180
seconds, whichever is sooner.




B. BASIC DECISION RULES
1. Automatically delay, by five to ten seconds, times to begin
target detection/acquisition for RED AFVs belonging to company com-
manders, due to the assumption that they will initially attempt to make
estimates of the situation, issue pertinent orders to subordinates,
report to higher headquarters, and request supporting fires.
2. For the expected-value game, a BLUE ATGM will not re-
engage the same target if P(MUF-KILL) = . 75 for that round, or if the
cumulative fractional catastrophic kill on that target has become
greater than or eqtial to . 50. Otherwise re-engage unless a higher
priority (threat) target is available. (The degree and realism of the
threat is judgmentally determined. )
3. For the "Monte Carlo" form of the manual game, assume a
system will only re-engage targets which have been hit when those
targets still pose a threat to the firer (or, for BLUE systems, a
threat to the mech infantry platoon).
4. Priority of targets for BLUE M60A2s are tanks maneuvering




TAB 2 (Elements of the Manual Game) to APPENDIX A
Within this tab are listed the critical event time distributions
(ENCLOSURE a and ENCLOSURE b), figures and tables relative to
hit probabilities and conditional kill probabilities (ENCLOSURE c),
and the sets of algorithms for both the "Monte Carlo"-type game
(ENCLOSURE d) and the expected-value game (ENCLOSUR.E e).
Co-located with the materials are the specific assumptions and
indications of the references used in their derivations.
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ENCLOSURE a. (Definition of Symbols) to APPENDIX A, TAB 2
T = Time to alert crew and prepare for the firing instructions
a
T / = Time to adiust subsequent roundsa/m J *
T, = Time for ATGM to begin engagement procedures =
max(Td ,T A ), j = l, 2 .
T , = Time to detect target for first time, given line -of- sight.
1
T^ = Time to detect target, given target handed-off.
2
T = Time to engage target, given target detected =
T^, Tm , Ti as appropriate.
T
f
= Time of flight of projectile.
T, = Time to fire subsequent round, given first hits.
T. = Time to projectile impact = T +T .
T = Time to make final lay (first round).
T. = Time to select ammunition and load gun.
T = Time to fire subsequent round, given previous round
misses.
T, = Time to fire first round, given a detection.
T_ = Time to range on target.
T = Time to swing gun roughly on target.
T
ff
= Time to sense round.
T , = Time to stop vehicle moving 15 km/h.
NOTE: T. is a realization of the random variable T., for all j.
J J








1 = M, S
.
m = M, H,
ENCLOSURE b (Basic Assumptions and References
by Engagement Types) to APPENDIX A, TAB 2
1. Engagement types have the form: i, j, k, 1, m, where
First or subsequent round at the same target.
D is direct/aimed fire. A is area/indirect fire.
M is moving firer. S is stationary firer.
M is moving target. S is stationary target.
M is previous round misses, H is previous round hits
1 Detection without external assistance.
2 Detection involving direction from external source
(Hand-off).
Detection and Engageinent Times by Engagement Types:
(Unless otherwise referenced, distributions are judgmentally
derived and simplified. )
References /Assumptions
a. 1DMS1 (-2, 1DMM1, -2,
1DSS1, -2, or 2DMMM)
(1) Tank: T. = (T, or T, ) +
1 d l d 2
T,+Tr Assume stabilized gun.
[Refs. 21 and 22]
P(Td t) l-exp(-0. 5t), U9. 2 Assume exponential (0. 5)
1
, t>9. 2 truncated at t=9.2 sec.
,
otherwise See CDF Figure 2.
t^ = 2 sec
P(T £'t)= l-exp(-0. It), t*46 Assume exponential (0. 1)
2 1
, t>46 truncated at t=46 sec.
, otherwise see CDF Figure 3.
Tj =10 secd 2
T =T +T +T„+T T Ref. 15, page 129.
2 a s R -L- » r- &















t = ( rr/4)/.525
= 1.5 sec
t = 9/a, where 9 is the
s
angle of turret traverse
and a is the rate of
turret traverse [Ref. 22]
Assume U [1,2]
P(T£t) = (t_.5)/5, . 5*t*5.
1 , t>5.5
, otlierwise




T = 3 sec
independent of range
due to use of target-
height comparison gra-
ticules [Ref. 2 1].
Assume U [2, 4]
t, is determined from Figure




= t +23. 5 sec
Without hand- off
With hand- off
For 1DSS1 (or-2) where tank is initial
ly moving: T =T +max(T , T ) +











gt , ts )
Assume T ,~U[l. 5, 3. 5]
st J
Assume Tst and T g are
independent.
See CDF Figtire 10.
Add 1 sec to each F.
,
above.




=(Td! or Td > +T l +T f
T = T„+T +Rr,+T
1 R






























Assume U [2, 5]
t f
is determined from Figure
T = t,+20. 5 sec
i
1








sf RtTL A ssume T ~U [1.5,3.5]st L
Assume T . and T are
st s
independent.
See CDF Fi gu r e 11.

















(3) 1DSS1 (1DSM1, 2DSSM, or
2DSMM) for all ATGM AT wpns
(a) For BLUE ATGM AT wpns Assume engagement process
:max(T,, T. ) follows loading,
P(T, = t) = l-exp(-. 2t), 0*t^24 Assume exponential (. 2
















t, = 6 sec
For first round of ambush, t , = and t is U [0. 5] by assumption.
Value of t is judgmentally determined.
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Fu = 7. 312 =7.3 secbe
Assume T,,T are indepen.
dent.
See CDF Figure 4.
For BLUE ATGM, Following distributions
given target derived from given median
detected: values and sample curves
found in Ref. 18.
T =T lf T , T\
e 1 m n
MAW:P(T =t)= l-exp(_. 082t), t>0 See CDF Figure 5.
,
otherwise
t = 12. 2 sec
e










t. = tf + t,+t , t£ = range/missile speed
MAW: t = R/200 m/sec
f
HAW: t = R/300 m/sec
A2(M): t = R/224 m/sec
[Ref. 29, p. 49]
For LAW and M-79: 1DSS1,
(1DSM1, 1ASS1, 1ASM1)











Assume same as for BLUE
ATGM.
Assume N(5, 1)











(b) For RED ATGM: 1DSS 1 or _2Assume initially moving.
P(Tbe' t) =













= 2. 984 = 3 sec
Assume BMP-76(M) has only-
one missile and BRDM(M)
may launch subsequent
missiles as soon as new tar-
get detected (following pre-
vious missile impact) for up
to three missiles. There-











same as for tanks.
See CDF Figures 2 and 3,









= 7. 823 i 7. 8 sec
P(T =t)= l-exp(_. 087t), tO
,
otherwise
ti = 11.5 sec
Assume same as HAW.





i f be 1
(c) For RED AT guns:
1DSS1.(_2, 1DSM1, -2,
1ASS1, -2, 1ASM1, or -2)
T, =max(T ., T, ), j=l, 2 See CDF Figures 2 and 3,DC St Q -I
T =T +T +TD +T T
1 a s R L








"t = 20 sec
Assume T same as for
a
tank.
Assume N(20, 6. 25)
See CDF Figure 12.
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f' 5P(TR+TL ^t)= /l/(2/r)' exp(-(x-11.5) / Assume N(l 1. 5, 2. 85)
ls 4. 5)dx [Rcf. 17]
for 5. 5^17.5
1
, t > 17. 5 See CDF Figure 13.
, otherwise
FR +T= 11.5 sec
t is determined from Figure [Ref. 17 and 20]
b. 2DMSM (or 2DSSM)
BMP-76 or AG
(1) Tank: T =max((T-+T , ), T.)m & a/m" /' , _ im
t Approx. equal T +T ,
f 5 2 a
a /m
P(T ^t)= /l/(2/7)' exp(-(x-8) /2)dx, Assume N(8, 1)
/ for 4^til2 See CDF Figure 8.
1 , t>12 Ref. 15, page 129.
, otherwise
F^ = 8 sec F = tr+tm i f m
(2) RED ATGM: 2DSSM (or 2DSMM) 1
T =T +T T Assume T is time to switchm s JLi
to next missile, U [1, 3 J





F = 2 sec
t s
P(T L ^t)= /l/(2B) exp(-(x-8) /2)dx, Assume N(8, 1)






(3) RED AT guns: 2DSSM (2DSMM,
2DSSH, 2DSMH, 2ASSM, 2ASMM,
2ASSH, or 2ASMH)
T =TU = T^+T,. Same as above,m n K L
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(4) For LAW and M-79: 2DSSM,(-H,
2DSMM, -H, 2ASSM, -H, 2ASMM, -H)
Tbe = T x Same as T for BLUE
ATGM.
T =T =Tu = T See CDF Figure 8.
[Refs. 8 and 37]
LAW: tr= range/ 145 m/sec Assume constant due to
t. ,
~ , , n , I relatively short range of bothM-79: t f = range/76 m/sec J b1 5 LAW and M-79-
c. 2DMSH (2DMMH, 2DSSH)






P(T,=t)= (t-4. 5)/3.5, 4. 5^t^8 Assume approximately
1
, t>8 U [4. 5, 8], See CDF Figure 9.
, otherwise
t, = 6. 25- 6. 3 sech
d. 2AMSM (2AMSH, 2AMMM, or 2AMMH)
BMP-76 or Assault Gun:
Tn^W^TV • T x » +T s +TR+TL
Assume max (T r , T. ) is





CDF for T, =max(T . ,T, )be st' d
.
= /xd[ (l-exp(-.Sx) ) (x-1.5)/2]+
J <t.i*














CDF for T, = max(T
.
,T, )be st' d'
". = /xd[ (l-exp(-.lx) ) (x-1.5)/2] +
oe j ^,
















CDF for T. = max(T 1 ,T 1 )
g be d' *
xd [ (1-exp (- . 2x) ) (x-4 ) /4 ]
+
24 +
xd (1-exp (-.2x))= 7.312
8 =7.3 sec
5 10 15











~t 1 1 v
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CDF for T , (2nd Round given
in first misses)
t = 8 sec= max(t
>
,tr +t , )=tm
NOTE: Use CDF for T^+T . for
<r a/m
TT : 2DSSM (SAGGER)
Li
4 6 8











t = max(t^,t.)= t.= 6.3 sec
e " A n
2 4 5 6












for/ A—CDF for max (T . ,T ), assuming T ,T . inde-
1 I st s s St
s : / pendent.





Figure 10. CDF., of max (T . ,T )





st/ T ), assuming T ,T (
independent.



































Figure 14. NORMAL (0,1) CDF
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ENCLOSURE c. (Hit/Kill Probabilities: Figures and Tables) to
APPENDIX A. TAB 2.
Figures: 15. PSSH: BEOS) for ATGM
16. CUMULATIVE PROBABILITY OF TIME TO BREAK
LINE- OF- SIGHT
17. P(SSH) FOR LAW FIRING AT T-62.
18. P(SSH) FOR LAW FIRING AT BMP-76.
19. P(SSH) FOR LAW FIRING AT BRDM.
20. • P(SSH) FOR M-79 FIRING AT T-62.
21. P(SSH) FOR M-79 FIRING AT BMP-76.
22. P(SSH) FOR M-79 FIRING AT BRDM.
23. PROJECTILE TIMES OF FLIGHT.
24. P(SSH) FOR 115MM HVAPFSDS.
25. P(SSH) FOR 76MM FSHEAT.
26. CASUALTY-PROBABILITY CONTOUR TEMPLATE 1.
27. CASUALTY- PROBABILITY CONTOUR TEMPLATE 2,
TABLES: II. CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY OF ENGAGEMENT
GIVEN P(SSH).
III, CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY OF KILL GIVEN
P(SSH)
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Figure 16. Cumulative Probability of Time to Break Line-
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Figure 17. P(SSH) for LAW Firing at T-62. [Ref. 38,
p
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Figure 20. P (SSH) for M-79 Firing at T-62. [By assumption
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^ebaej, Ajeuot^^^S ui£'3 X ^£ * 3 uo (HSS)d
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I83jei Ajeuoneis wflXMfi uo (HSS)d
Figure 25. P(SSH) for 7 6nm FSHEAT [Refs. 24: Table 48;
25: APPENDIX A, p. 24; 39, p. 36 4; 22, p. 64]
84

[Ref. 24, p. 79]
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ENGAGEMENT PROBABILITIES, GIVEN HIT PROBABILITIES
P(SSH) P(E)
1.00 - .60 1.00
.59 - .50 .95
.49 - .35 .85
.34 - .25 .65
.24 - .00 .50
1
















































































































































































































































AFV MAIN GUN ROUNR-TO-ROUND DISPERSION (HE/HEAT)




































[ Assumed values extrapolated from data in Ref. 24, p,
24, 27; Ref. 20, p. 34, 46]
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ENCLOSURE d. (Algorithms for the "Monte Carlo"-Type Manual Game)
to APPENDIX A, TAB 2.
ALGORITHM I. Determination of T and T .
d be
ALGORITHM II. Determination of Engagement Times, Given Target
Detected.
ALGORITHM III. ATGM Engagement of AFVs: Resulting P .
ALGORITHM IV. LAW and M-79 Engagement of AFVs: Resulting Pk .
ALGORITHM V, AFV and AT Gun Main Gun Direct Fire at Personnel
and Ground-mounted, Crew-served Weapons
(includes MAW): Resulting P .
ALGORITHM VI. AFV and AT Gun Main Gun Area Fire at Personnel
and Ground-mounted, Crew-served Weapons
(includes MAW): Resulting P .





ALGORITHM I (Determination of T and T, )
d be
(See APPENDIX A, TAB 2, ENCLOSURE a for definitions of symbols. )
NOTE: For BLUE weapon systems, the first detections are
assumed to be completed prior to t = in order to fire between t = and
t=5 sec. In all cases, time to detect the same target, given the target
was missed with a previous round from the same weapon, =0.
STEPS
1. If the system is a BLUE weapon, GO TO 4.
2. Judgmentally determine from the scenario diagram which
targets have intervisibility with the system. If situation indicates that
a visual detection of the BLUE target is likely, T ,=T : [(If system
d d±
is a RED ATGM, Tbe =max(T st , Td ), use CDF Figure 2, and GO TO 5. )
Otherwise, use CDF Figure 2, but use CDF for T, . GO TO 5].
3. If the situation indicates a target hand-off is likely, for
example, an individual tank following platoon leader's direction and
engaging the same target, T =T : [if system is a RED ATGM, T, =
d d2 be
max (T ,, T ) use CDF Figure 3, and GO TO 5. ) Otherwise, use
CDF Figure 3, but use CDF for Td and GO TO 5. ]
4. Judgmentally determine from the scenario diagram which
targets have intervisibility with the system: [(For subsequent engage-
ment of the same target for LAW and M-79, Tbe = T ; and tbe =4RN+4;
STOP.)
Otherwise, for first and subsequent engagements by other BLUE sys-
tems, T =max(T ,T ). Use CDF Figure 5, GO TO 5. ]be d
5. Draw RN. On CDF figure assigned by previous step, enter
vertical axis at value of RN. Project horizontally to curve of distribu-
tion. From point of intersection, project vertically downard to the
time axis and read the realization of the random variable T n or T, ,d be




(Determination of Engagement Times, Given Target Detected)
(See APPENDIX A, TAB 2, ENCLOSURE a, for definitions of symbols)
STEPS
1. Determine engagement type from, scenario diagram, results
of ALGORITHM I, and ENCLOSURE b, to APPENDIX A, TAB 2.
2. From ENCLOSURE b, determine the formulas for T , T T ,
e' I'
T , T , as appropriate. (For each engagement type, only one applies;
that, is? T = T,orT or T . )e 1 m h
3. Determine the number of random variables in the equation
which must be calculated (for example, max(T
s ^,
T ) is considered
to be one random variable and has one assigned CDF figure).
4. Draw a random number for each distribution of interest.
5. For each uniform random variable, T., use the linear
Jtransformation: Length of Interval (RN) + Value of Lower Bound = t..
Round time (t.) to nearest tenth of a second.
J
6. For other distributions wherein an assigned CDF figure is
made, on the CDF figure assigned for that random variable, enter
the vertical axis at the value of the RN. Project horizontally to
curve of the appropriate distribution (some CDF figures have more
than one distribution represented). From point of intersection,
project vertically downward to the time axis and read the realization
of the random variable of interest. Round value to the nearest tenth
of a second.
7. Sum all realizations of the independent variables, as
appropriate, to calculate the value of the realization of the dependent
variable (the appropriate engagement time). STOP.
92

ALGORITHM III (ATGM Engagement of AFVs: Resulting P )
K.
STEPS
1. From scenario diagram and TIME-HISTORY form, determine
possible target intervisibilities and range to nearest assigned or high
priority target. Determine time to begin engagement process from
ALGORITHM I. Determine time to engage (fire) from ALGORITHM II.
2. Calculate time of projectile flight (t ) by ATGM type:
t = range to target/missile velocity. (See Enclosure b)
3. Determine P(SSH:BLOS) from Figure 15, given range to target.
4. Determine P(Engagement: P(SSH:BLOS)) from Table II. Draw
a random number. If RN > P(E: P(SSH: BLOS) ), record as no engagement,
begin detection/engagement process again (determine from scenario
diagram, earliest time to high enough P(SSH:BLOS). STOP
3
5. Determine P(Tgt breaks LOS: t- and tgt speed) from Figure 16.
6. P(SSH)= P(SSH:BLOS) (l-P(BLOS)), P(BLOS) calculated in
Step 5.
4
7. Draw RN. If RN > P(SSH), missile misses; GO TO 8. If
RN^P(SSH), missile hits; GO TO 9.
8. Calculate time to next engagement from ALGORITHMS I and II,
record on TIME-HISTORY form, STOP.
9. Draw RN. Compare with Pi(M, F, C, MUF) values listed in
Table III to determine type of kill, if any. Record results on TIME-
HISTORY form. Calculate time to next engagement from ALGORITHMS
I and II. Record results on forms for FORCE LEVELS (Tgt List).
STOP.
For first rounds of ambush, targets are assigned, hand-offs are
completed, and first rounds are fired within the first five seconds
(judgmentally determined times).
•
2 For first rounds of ambush, P(E: P(SSH: BLOS))= 1 . 0, except for
very low P(SSH) wherein judgement is used to determine P(E).
•^Reference 18, pages 4-16 and 4-17.
^Assume negligible effect from near misses. Mobility and fire-
power suppression (time delays) may be judgmentally applied.
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1. From scenario diagram and TIME-HISTORY form, determine
possible target intervisibilities and range to nearest assigned or high
priority target. Determine time to begin engagement process from
ALGORITHM I. Determine time to engage (fire) from ALGORITHM II.
2. Calculate time of projectile flight:
b.f
t. = range to target/ projectile muzzle velocity (See Enclosure
3. Determine P(SSH), given range to target and aspect and speed
of target, from Figures 17 through 22, as appropriate.
4. Determine P(E:P(SSH)) from Table II. Draw a RN. If RN >
P(E:P(SSH)), record as no engagement on TIME-HISTORY form, begin
detection/engagement process again (determine from scenario diagram
the earliest time to high enough P(SSH)). STOP.
5. Draw RN. IfRN)P(SSH), projectile misses; GO TO 7. 3 If
RN fP(SSH), missile hits.
6. Draw RN. Compare with P, (M, F, C, MUF) values listed in
Table III to determine type of kill, if any. Record results on TIME-
HISTORY form and FORCE LEVELS (Tgt List) forms.
7. Calculate time to next engagement from ALGORITHMS I and II,
record on TIME-HISTORY form. STOP.
For first rounds of ambush, targets are assigned, hand-offs are
completed, and first rounds are fired within the first five seconds
(judgmentally determined times).
For first rouncs of ambush P(E)=1. 0, except for very low
P(SSH). In such cases, P(E) is judgmentally determined.
Assume negligible effect from near misses. Mobility and fire-
power suppression (time delays) may be judgmentally applied.
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ALGORITHM V (AFV and AT Gun Main Gun Direct Fire at Personnel
and Ground-mounted, Crew-served Weapons (includes MAW):
Resulting P, )
STEPS
1. From the scenario diagram and TIME-HISTORY form, deter-
mine possible target intervisibilities and range to most likely target.
Determine time to begin engagement process from ALGORITHM I.
Determine time to engage (fire) from ALGORITHM II.
2. Calculate time of projectile flight, given range to target:
Use Figure 23.
3. From the scenario diagram, determine which targets are
within a 250X250mgrid centered at the aim point/expected impact point
at time of impact.
4. Assume targets have cover corresponding to vulnerable area
presented by a prone man, facing the point of impact if still in firing
positions. Otherwise assume vulnerable area presented by a crouch-
ing man. Place the base of each target on the grid, relative to the
aim point.
5. Draw two RNs. Enter the vertical axis of CDF Figure 14
with the value of each RN and project horizontally to the curve of the
distribution. From the point of intersection, project vertically down-
ward to the <T axis and read the values of the coefficients.
x, y
6. Multiply the values read by the appropriate (T
__
or <r
values found in TABLE IV: This gives the randomly selected ceriter of
projectile impact (-assuming an elliptic normal dispersion pattern).
Place the appropriate Casualty-Probability Contour Template (Figure
26 or 27) on the point of impact, long axis oriented outward along the
gun-target line. Figure 26 for prone personnel and Figure 27 for
crouching personnel. For each target falling within the contours,
note the appropriate P(SSK).
7. Scale each P(SSK) calculated in Step 6 by the following: Scale
factor 1.0 for 115 mm; .9 for 100 mm; .8 for 85 mm; and .75 for
76 mm.
8. Draw a RN for each target covered by the template: If RN >
P(SSK)fScale Factor), fragments miss the target; GO TO 9- If RN^
P(SSK)(Scale Factor), target hit (assumed killed). Judgmentally apply
any material damage or restrictions on the unit due to position of the
casualty (e. g. , radio operator versus MAW gunner). Record results
on TIME-HISTORY form and FORCE LEVEL (Tgt List) form.
95

9. Calculate time to next engagement from ALGORITHMS I and
II, record on TIME-HISTORY form. STOP.
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ALGORITHM VI (AFV and AT Gun Main Gun Area Fire at Personnel
and Ground-mounted, Crew-served Weapons (includes MAW):
Resulting P )
STEPS
1. From the scenario diagram and TIME-HISTORY form,
determine the range and direction to desired point of projectile impact
(judgmentally applied).
2. Calculate time of projectile flight tr from Figure 23, given
range to impact point.
3. On the scenario diagram, determine which targets are within
a 250 X 250m grid centered on the point of impact at time of impact.
4. On a 250 X 250m grid, randomly place each target found from
Step 3, above:
Draw two RNs. Let W = width and depth of target at base,
within the impact area. Let x =(RN ,-0. 5 ) (250- W), let y =(RN 2 _0. 5
)
(250-W). [Ref. 40].
5. Place each target on the grid using the coordinates calculated
in Step 3. (NOTE: Grid Center has coordinates (0, 0)).
6. Place the appropriate Casualty-Probability Contour Template
(Figure 27 or 28) on the center of the grid, long axis in the positive
Y-direction. For each target falling within the contours, note the
appropriate P(SSK).
7. Scale each P(SSK) calculated in Step 4 by the following:
Scale Factor: 1 for 115mm; .9 for 100mm; .8 for 85mm; and .75 for
76mm.
8. Draw a RN for each target covered by the template: If RN>
P(SSK)(Scale Factor), fragments miss the target, GO TO 7. If RN^
P(SSK)(Scale Factor), target hit (assumed killed). Judgmentally apply
any material damage or restrictions on the unit due to the position of
the casualty. Record results on TIME-HISTORY form and FORCE
LEVEL (Tgt List) form.
9. Calculate time to next engagement from ALGORITHMS I and
II, record on TIME-HISTORY form. STOP.
Assume targets have vulnerable area corresponding to prone man,
facing the point of impact, if personnel still in firing position (use Fig-
ure 26). Otherwise targets have vulnerable area corresponding to a
crouching man (Use Figxire 27).
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ALGORITHM VII (AFV and AT Gun Main Gun Direct Fire at
Armored Targets: Resulting P.)
1C
STEPS
1. From the scenario diagram and TIME-HISTORY form, deter-
mine possible target intervisibilities and range to most likely target.
Determine the time to begin the engagement process from ALGORITHM
I. Determine time to engage (fire) from ALGORITHM II.
2. Calculate the time of projectile flight, given range to target:
Use Figure 24.
3. Determine P(SSH), given range to target and aspect and speed
of the target, from Figures 24 and 26, as appropriate.
4. Determine P(E:P(SSH)) from Table II. Draw a RN. If RN->
P(E:P(SSH)), record as no engagement on TIME-HISTORY form;
begin detection/engagement process again (determine from scenario
diagram the earliest time to high enough P(SSH)). (Immediate fires
which are part of counterambush procedures are judgmentally applied. )
STOP.
1
5. Draw RN. If RN>P(SSH), projectile misses; GO TO 7. If
RNtP(SSH), projectile hits target.
6. Draw RN. Compare with Pk(M, F, C, MUF) values listed in
Table III, to determine type of kill, if any. Record results on TIME-
HISTORY form and FORCE LEVEL (Tgt List) forms.
7. Calculate time to next engagement from ALGORITHMS I and
II, record on TIME-HISTORY form. STOP.
Assume negligible effect from near misses. Mobility and fire
power suppression (time delays) may be judgmentally applied.
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ENCLOSURE e. (Algorithms for the Expected- Value Manual Game)
to APPENDIX A, TAB 2.
ALGORITHM EV-I. Determination of t , and t^ .
ALGORITHM EV-II. Determination of Expected Engagement Times,
Given Target Detection.





LAW and M-79 Engagement of AFVs:
Resulting P, .
AFV and AT Gun Main Gun Direct Fire at
Personnel and Ground-mounted, Crew-served
Weapons (includes MAW): Resulting P, .
AFV and AT Gun Main Gun Area Fire at
Personnel and Ground-mounted, Crew-served
Weapons (includes MAW): Resulting P..
AFV and AT Gun Main Gun Direct Fire at
Armored Targets: Resulting P..
ALGORITHM EV-VIII. Fractional Kill Determination.
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(See APPENDIX A, TAB 2, ENCLOSURE a, for definitions of symbols)
NOTE: For BLUE weapon systems, the first detections are
assumed to be completed prior to t = in order to fire between t=0 and
t=5 sec. In all cases, time to detect the same target, given the target
was missed with a previous round from the same weapon, = 0. Actual
first firing times are judgmentally assigned.
STEPS
1. If the system is a BLUE weapon, GO TO 4.
2. Judgmentally determine from the scenario diagram which
targets have intervisibility with the system. If the situation indicates
that a visual detection of the BLUE target is likely, t^=t j : [if system
is a RED ATGM, Tbe=max(T ., Td ), therefore, Tbe = 3 sec. STOP. )
Otherwise, t^ =2 sec. STOP. ]
3. If the situation indicates a target hand-off is likely, for
example, an individual tank following platoon leader's direction and
engaging the same target, t = t^ : [(If system is a RED ATGM, T =
max(T . , Tj ); therefore, Tu = 7.8 sec. STOP.) Otherwise, T, = 10v st d e be ^2
sec. STOP.]
4. Judgmentally determine from the scenario diagram which
targets have intervisibility with the system: [(For subsequent engage-
ment of the same target for LAW and M-79, T = T^ ; therefore,
t = 6 sec. STOP.) Otherwise, T, =max(T,,T. ). Therefore,be be o a
E =7.3 sec. STOP.]be J
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ALGORITHM EV-II (Determination of Expected Engagement Times,
Given Target Detection)
(See APPENDIX A, TAB 2, ENCLOSURE a, for definitions of symbols
STEPS
1. Determine engagement type from scenario diagram, results of
ALGORITHM EV-I, and APPENDIX A, TAB 2, ENCLOSURE b.
2. From ENCLOSURE b, determine the formulas for T , Tj,
Tm , or Ti , as appropriate. (For each engagement type, T = T, or
3. Select the appropriate expected engagement time listed by
that engagement type in ENCLOSURE b, according to weapon system.




ALGORITHM EV-III (ATGM Engagement of AFVs: Resulting P )
STEPS
1. From the scenario diagram and TIME-HISTORY form, deter-
mine possible target intervisibilities and range to nearest assigned or
high priority target. Determine expected time to begin engagement
process from ALGORITHM EV.I. Determine expected time to engage
(fire) from ALGORITHM EV-II.





= range to target/missile velocity. (See APPENDIX A,
TAB 2, ENCLOSURE b. )
3. Determine P(SSH:BLOS) from Figure 15, given range to target.
4. Judgmentally determine advisability of engaging target (trade-
off between revealing firing position, due to weapon signature, and
possible low hit probability). If firing is aborted, determine the
earliest time to a high enough P(SSH:BLOS). STOP. Otherwise,
2
5. Determine P(BLOS), given t and target speed from Figure 16.
6. P(SSH) = P(SSH:BLOS) (l-P(BLOS)).
7. Select appropriate P(KILL:SSH) from Table III.
8. Multiply each P(KILL:SSH) by P(SSH) determined in Step 6.
(For example, if from Table III, P(M-KILL:SSH) = .90, and
P(SSH) =
. 50, then P(M-KILL) = . 45. )
9. Determine the firer's firepower effectiveness (%F) from FORM
C or D, as of the time of missile impact. Multiply the value determined
by each of the P(KILL), by category of kill, and enter these results on
FORM A, TIME-HISTORY.
10. GO TO ALGORITHM EV-VIII. (Fractional Kill Determination).
For first rounds of the ambush, targets are assigned, hand-offs
are completed, and first rounds are fired within the first five seconds
(judgmentally determine firing times).
2
Reference 18, pages 4-16 and 4-17.
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ALGORITHM EV-IV (LAW and M-79 Engagement of AFVs: Resulting Pk )
STEPS
1. From the scenario diagram and TIME-HISTORY form, deter-
mine possible target intervisibilities and range to nearest assigned or
high priority target. Determine expected time to begin engagement
process from ALGORITHM EV-I. Determine expected time to engage
(fire) from ALGORITHM EV-IL
2. Calculate time of projectile flight:
Assume constant velocities of 145 m/sec for LAW and 76
m/sec for the M-79 HEDP round. (Due to the short ranges involved).
3. Determine P(SSH), given range to target and aspect and speed
of the target, from Figures 17 through 22, as appropriate.
4. Judgmentally determine advisability of engaging target (trade-
off between revealing firing position, due to weapon signature, and low
hit probability). If firing is aborted, determine earliest time to high
enough P(SSH). STOP. Otherwise,
5. Select appropriate P(KILL:SSH) from Table III.
6. Multiply each P(KILL:SSH), by category of kill, by P(SSH)
determined in Step 5. (For example, if from Table III, P(M_KILL:SSH)
=
.90, and P(SS) = .50, then P(M-KILL) = .45).
7. Determine the firer's firepower effectiveness (%F) from
FORM C or D, as of the time of firing. Multiply the value determined
by each of the P(KILL), by category of kill, and enter these results on
FORMA (TIME-HISTORY).
8. GO TO ALGORITHM EV-VIII. (Fractional Kill Determination).
For first rounds of the ambush, targets are assigned, hand-offs
are completed, and first rounds are fired within the first five seconds
(judgmentally determine firing times).
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ALGORITHM EV.V (AFV and AT GUN Main Gun Direct Fire at
Personnel and Ground -mounted, Crew- served Weapons
(includes MAW): Resulting P, )
STEPS
1. From the scenario diagram and TIME-HISTORY form, deter-
mine possible target intervisibilities and range to most likely target.
Determine expected time to begin engagement from ALGORITHM EV-I.
Determine expected time to engage (fire) from ALGORITHM EV-II.
2. Calculate time of projectile flight (t ) from Figure 23, given
range to target.
3. From the scenario diagram, determine which targets are
within a 250m X 250m grid centered at the aim point/expected impact
point at time of impact.
4. Assume targets have cover corresponding to vulnerable area
presented by a prone man, facing the point of impact, if the personnel
still in firing positions. Otherwise, assume a vulnerable area equal
to that for a crouching man [Ref. 24, pages 50 through 85].
5. Use Figure 26, CASUALTY-PROBABILITY CONTOUR
TEMPLATE 1, for the first case in Step 4; and Figure 27, CASUALTY-
PROBABILITY CONTOUR TEMPLATE 2, for the second case, as
appropriate.
6. Place the base of the template on the origin of the 250m X 250m
grid. For each target covered by a contour line, or between lines
(interplate approximate values), record the appropriate P(SSK).
7. Scale each P(SSK) calculated in Step 6 by the following:
Scale Factor: 1.0 for 115mm, .90 for 100mm, .80 for 85mm,
and
. 75 for 76mm. If any target within five meters of the aim point,
GO TO 10.
8. Determine the firer's firepower effectiveness (%F) from
FORM C or D, as the time of firing. Multiply the scaled P(SSK)'s
by this value to get the corrected P(SSK)'s. Record these results on
FORMA, TIME-HISTORY.
Degrade the firepower and mobility effectiveness of each
t by twice the value of the corrected
results as per ALGORITHM EV-VIII. STOP.
target hit P(SSK). Record the




10. Ftirther correct for mean aim error by multiplying the
P(SSK), for each target within five meters of the expected aim point,
by the value of P(SSH) on a stationary 2. 3 m X Z. 3 m target, at that
range. GO TO 8.
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ALGORITHM EV.VI (AFV and AT GUN Main Gun Area Fire at Personnel
and Ground-mounted, Crew-served Weapons (includes MAW);
Resulting P, )
STEPS
1. From the scenario diagram and TIME-HISTORY form, deter-
mine the range and direction to desired point of projectile impact.
(This is judgmentally determined).
2. Calculate time of projectile flight (tr) from Figure 23, given
range to impact point.
3. From the scenario diagram, determine which targets are
within a 250m X 250m grid centered at the aim point/expected impact
point, at the time of impact.
4. Place the appropriate CASUALTY-PROBABILITY CONTOUR
TEMPLATE (Figure 26 or 27) on the center of the grid, long axis
along the gun-target line. For each target covered by the contours,
note the appropriate P(SSK).
5. Scale each P(SSK) calculated in Step 4 by the following:
Scale Factor: 1. for 115 mm, . 90 for 100 mm, . 80 for 85mm,
and .75 for 76 mm.
6. Determine the firer's firepower effectiveness (%F) from
FORM C or D, as of the time of firing. Multiply the scaled P(SSK)'s
by this value to get the corrected P(SSK)'s. Record these results on
FORMA, TIME-HISTORY.
7. Degrade the firepower and mobility effectiveness of each
target hit by twice the value of the corrected P(SSK). Record the
results as per ALGORITHM EV-VIII.
Assume targets have vulnerable area corresponding to a prone
man, facing the point of impact, if personnel still in firing positions
(use Figure 26). Otherwise, targets have vulnerable area correspond-
ing to a crouching man (use Figure 27).
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ALGORITHM EV.VII (AFV and AT GUN Main Gun Direct Fire at
Armored Targets: Resulting P, )
STEPS
1. From the scenario diagram and TIME-HISTORY form, deter-
mine possible target intervisibilities and range to most likely target.
Determine the expected time to begin the engagement process from
ALGORITHM EV-I. Determine the expected time to engage (fire) from
ALGORITHM EV-II.
2. Calculate the time of projectile flight, given range to target
using Figure 23.
3. Determine P(SSH), given range to target and aspect and speed
of target or firer, from Figures 24 and 26, as appropriate.
4. Select appropriate P(KILL:SSI1) from Table III.
5. Determine the firer 's firepower effectiveness (%F) from FORM
C or D, as of the time of firing. Multiply the value determined by each
of the P(KILL), by category of kill, and enter these results on FORM A,
TIME-HISTORY.
6. GO TO ALGORITHM EV.VIII (Fractional Kill Determination).
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ALGORITHM EV.VIII (Fractional Kill Determination)
STEPS
1. Determine entering values of P(M-KILL), P(F_KILL), and
P(C-KILL) from the appropriate weapon system engagement algorithm
(ALGORITHMS EV-III through EV-VII).
2. From FORM C, for BLUE target, or FORM D, for RED target,
determine the remaining target effectiveness immediately prior to round
impact.
3. Degrade "%M" and "%F" by the entering P(M-KILL) and
P(F-KILL) values. (For example, if the target had already been frac-
tionally killed, and had "%M"=. 80 then if the entering P(M-KTLL) = . 70,
the new "%M" would =. 80-(. 80)(. 70) = . 80-. 56 = . 24. Similarly, for "%F"=
.70, and P(F_KILL) = . 40, the new "%F"=. 70( 1- . 40) = . 42. ) Record these
new "%M" and "%F" values on FORM C or D, by the effective time.
4. Compute the amounts of M or F-Kill to be credited to the
impacting round, by multiplying the corresponding category of P(KILL)
by the "%M" or "%F" values on FORM C or D, as appropriate. Enter
these amounts on FORM E or F (depending upon whether target is a
BLUE or RED system).
5. In a similar manner to that stated above, the current level of
catastrophic kill of each target is determined by adding to the previous
value of C, found on FORM C or D, the amount ( l-C)P(C-KILL). The
amount added, in each case, is the value indicated on FORM E or F,
as appropriate. The current value of C is then recorded on FORM C
or D, by the effective time of occurrence.
6. At the end of the game, the exchange ratios and loss rates
are determined from the totals of the fractional kills recorded on
FORMs C through F; and are then transferred to FORM B, FORCE
LEVEL (Tgt List), as initial values for the next ambush iteration.
7. As necessary, return to the immediately previous algorithm
for completion of any remaining steps. Check scenario diagram and
TIME-HISTORY form to determine next critical event. STOP.
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TAB 3 (Analysis of Exercise Results) to APPENDIX A
Within this tab are an analysis of one iteration of the manual war
game employing the "Monte Carlo" approach, and one wherein an
expected-value approach was employed.
The former approach was used primarily to gain insight into the
validity of the initial assumptions and derivation of more, in order to
finalize the scenario and computational framework for the expected-
value approach. The analyses of both include extracts of the time-
history of engagements, and sample records of the engagements in-
dicating the procedures employed.
The reader is cautioned to not attempt any direct comparison of
the battle results, as some of the critical event time distributions
were altered following additional research, during the development of
the expected-value approach.
ENCLOSURE a (Analysis of the "Monte Carlo"- Type War Game
Results) includes a listing of observations relative to the simplifying
modeling assumptions and tactics employed.
ENCLOSURE b (Analysis of the Expected- Value War Game Results)
includes the discussion of a simple methodology for determining force
exchange ratios and weapon system loss rates.
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ENCLOSURE a. (Analysis of the "Monte Carlo"- Type War Game Results)
to APPENDIX A, TAB 3.
A listing of the major game results is recorded in TABLE V,
with the initial three kills reflected on the attached sample TIME-
HISTORY form, FORM A. Note that each engagement is recorded
twice - once at the time of weapon system firing, wherein the calculated
projectile impact time (t-) signals the placement of the engagement within
the sequencing of critical events; and, once at the time of impact when
the results are computed.
An example of judgmental application of the algorithms is shown on
FORM A, at t= 5. 1 seconds. Here, regardless of P(SSH) for the M-79,
since the HEDP round had been fired at t= 1 sec and could not be guided
in flight, it was caused to be a miss. Note that the MAW, M , had, at
3
t= 3. 5 sec, achieved a mobility-kill on the same target, thus, by
assumption, effectively stopping its forward motion.
The high kill rate for the MAWs was attributed to the short ranges
of engagement effectively precluding line-of-sight-breaking evasive
maneuvers by the target AFVs.
The counterambush tactic which was examined for the BMP- 76s
was to fire HEAT ammunition at the mech infantry platoon positions,
while attempting to close with same. This produced negligible results
due to the relatively slow rate of fire and low P(SSH), since the 76mm
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Since the MAW gunner is particularly vulnerable due to a need to
maintain his sight on the target throughout missile flight, it was felt
that a better suppressive effect might possibly be created by having the
BMP-76s fire their coax-MGs. This system also has a relatively low
hit probability for any one round or single short burst [Ref. 41], but
the rate of fire allows good area coverage, and a more constant sup-
pressive effect (given that the gunner has some form of missile firing
signature on which to sight).
Another judgmental aspect of the game was the decision to fire
the LAW and M-79 at ranges resulting in very low P(SSH)s. In reality,
the gunners would probably not have fired (and revealed their firing
positions) but have waited until assured a higher hit probability. The
trade-off becomes complicated when they have waited too long and find
themselves being maneuvered upon and decisively engaged.
The fact that the BLUE forces sustained little in the v/ay of sig-
nificant casualties until after the mech platoon started to withdraw
implies that there is a "safe" time caused by the shock and confusion
created by the surprise of the ambush. The length of such a time
interval is of major concern to the ambush planner. It was seen that
when the HAW and M60A2s attempted to remain in firing positions
long enough to complete the withdrawal of the mech platoon, that
significant losses began to be felt. The question then becomes one of,
"Should the infantry withdraw sooner? " or, "Should the HAW and
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M60A2 displace to new firing positions after having fired one, or at
most two missiles? " These questions are not answered here, but it
is noted that the answer is greatly scenario-dependent. (See ENCLO-
SURE b, this tab, for further discussion on this point. )
An obvious example of a type result from such a choice of tactics
is the action recorded at t= 156 seconds. Here, the T-62, lb, in
attempting to close with the withdrawing 2nd Squad, encountered the
3rd Squad, mounted and moving in its armored personnel carrier.
The complete vulnerability of the APC to the tank is apparent given
that the APC is armed with only a Cal. . 50 machine gun. Here, the
BLUE tanks were not in a position to provide continuous overwatch.
The above-mentioned situation suggests an additional, and often
voiced, trade-off problem; that being, an optimal placement of vehicles,
range of engagement, and time of disengagement (withdrawal). To be
safe from being maneuvered on in a short period of time, the mech
platoon must either be at extreme ranges, have very favorable terrain
conditions, or withdraw sooner.
The first alternative negates the effect of the LAW and M-79 and
is, therefore, bad from the standpoint of maximum effective use of
available, antiarmor weapon systems. The second alternative is
better, but such terrain, affording obstacles to the RED force, and
providing immediate covered and concealed withdrawal routes, is
likely to be recognized as such by the enemy, with resultant modifica-
tions in his approach. The third alternative needs to be examined in
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greater detail, in light of the weapon system attrition rates effected
over set time intervals. A first cut at this is discussed in ENCLOSURE
b to this tab.
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ENCLOSURE b. (Analysis of the Expected- Value Manual War Game
Results) to APPENDIX A, TAB 3.
The statement of a few caveats relative to the expected-value
methodology, as herein employed, are appropriate. This procedure,
as configured, must be exercised with caution since an error in the
computation of fractional kills or residual firepower effectiveness for
a system will affect all futxire interactions (values of fractional kills
resulting from engagements with other systems). This is especially
the case when both firer and target have undergone multiple engage-
ments, and, consequently, are neither at full effectiveness at the time
of the engagement in question. Additionally, care must be taken to
check the curmilative catastrophic kill level (C) of a BLUE system
before allowing it to continue its automatic event sequencing, since,
if it fires at a target after having been itself at least 50% catastrophically
killed, it will have violated Procedure 10, of TAB 1 (The Manual War
Game: Procedures and Rules) to APPENDIX A.
Also, a clear perception of the progress of the battle is required
to realistically play the direct and area fire of AFVs and AT guns at
personnel targets. In this line, great flexibility of choice of aim/
expected impact points is afforded.
Relative to the iteration which was run, as the battle progressed
to later stages, wherein all of the RED weapon systems which had tar-
gets within range engaged same, the expected-value game quickly
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became a very time consuming exercise. For this reason, the battle
was terminated at a point which clearly indicated the trend of events,
as the BLUE system loss rate began to become significant, indicating
the non-feasibility of BLUE continuing to employ the same tactics. To
a degree, this point was predictable since the "Monte Carlo" approach
had indicated it would happen. Intuitively, it holds also, as there is
a point when the ambusher loses the effect of surprise and the
numerically superior ambushed force begins to effectively react.
Basically the same scenario was played for the expected-value
game as was previously exercised, with the exception of BMP-76 main
gun fire. In the expected-value approach, the BM.P-76s halted to fire
at all long-range armored targets, and fired on the move at all short
and medium range personnel and ground-mounted, crew-served weapons,
including MAW.
A complete listing of TIME-HISTORY forms showing the progress
of the battle is available on request; but it will suffice here to show the
final system effectiveness levels as of game termination, the break-
down of losses by weapon system type, and a sample TIME-HISTORY
sheet. The record forms have little meaning in isolation, but in con-
junction with each other give a fairly clear picture of how the battle
progressed.
The enclosed TIME-HISTORY form represents the same basic
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Note the use of the dual recording of engagements with the checks
made in column k indicating that these firings have been recorded a
second time and the resulting fractional kills recorded. The kills
scored in column n incorporate the residual levels of effectiveness
resulting from previous engagements by both firer and target.
Additional markings in column p opposite the events at t= 2. 1
and t= 2.5 seconds show that the subsequent engagements of new tar-
gets were terminated at 16. 3 and 18. 3 seconds of the battle, respec-
tively, due to both M^ and M having reached levels of catastrophic
kill equal to, or in excess of, 50%.
The enclosed FORM B, FORCE LEVELS (Tgt List), shows the
residual levels of effectiveness at the time of game termination. In
this case, termination occurred prior to entrance into the battle of the
85 mm ATAP systeins in the RED battalion second echelon. Here,
the t. represents the time a system begins to react to the situation
in r jo
and actively seeks a target. Theoretically, the residual effectiveness
levels at the end of one iteration of the game would act as inputs to the
next iteration.
The results of significant engagements are recorded on the forms
C through F. FORMs C and D indicate the residual mobility and fire-
power effectiveness of the indicated system immediately following the
last engagement in which losses were incurred. The cumulative
catastrophic kill level to that time is also recorded. FORMs E and
120
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F reflect the breakdown of system kills by weapon type, allowing for
easy summation and comparison.
Since one cannot isolate, completely, two types of weapon systems
for the determination of weapon exchange ratios and still have any
meaning due to the homogeneous forces involved, it becomes necessary
to examine the results in aggregation. Note that seldom was it the
case, or realistically would it be the case, that any two types of weapon
systems would only engage and attrit each other.
In line with the foregoing, a methodology for comparison of non-
similar systems was needed. Realizing the limitations of such method-
ologies, but seeing no better alternatives, it was decided to scale the
relative values of the component systems in the forces in a simple
manner, not completely dissimilar from Fire Power Potential and
Weapon Effectiveness Indices /Weighted Unit Values methodologies
[Ref. 35 and 36], yet also not as detailed. The following values or






20 points T-62 37 points
35 points BMP-76 30 points
40 points BMP-76(M) 35 points
5 points BRDM(ATGM) 30 points
3 points 85mmATAP 28 points
An excellent discussion of the limitations of such methodologies
in the context of expected value and "Monte Carlo" type games is given
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Each fractional kill recorded was then multiplied by the appropriate
system weight to give the aggregate loss to the force. Figure 28
shows the cumulative losses over time of both the RED and BLUE
forces, to the point of game termination. Note that this was done just
as the last M60A2 completed its second engagement. The next sched-
uled BLUE system firing wotild have been at 54. 3 seconds of the battle,
while numerous RED systems were scheduled to fire within the next
two seconds following termination, several of which were on their
second or third rounds at the same target (hit probabilities normally
increasing as the firer achieves sensing of previous rounds).
In the trivial sense, BLUE disengagement before 16. 3 seconds
would yield the best exchange ratio. This would, of course, require
the mech infantry platoon to withdraw immediately following the firing
of one round from each weapon system. As of t= 16. 3, the force
exchange ratio is 128. 5/14. 7= 8. 75. By the time the next RED loss
is incurred (t= 24.4 sec), the exchange ratio has dropped to 137.67/
42.82= 3.22. And, by game termination, the ratio is down to 181.815/
113.943= 1.6, with further reductions imminent.
The weapon system loss rates have been approximated and listed
in Table VI. These rates are derived from the fractional losses
recorded in FORMs C through F. Of significance is the decrease in
RED system loss rates after the first 15 seconds and the six-fold
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WEAPON SYSTEM FRACTIONAL LOSS RATES (KILLS/SEC)
T-62 BMP-76 MAW HAW M60A2 LAW M-79
By t= 15 sec
By t= 3 sec
By t= 4 0.5 sec'
.198 .0419
.107 .0272 .062 2 .00797 ,00575
.105 .021 .0468 .00946 .0356 .00078 .0006
Corresponds to 1.857 kills in 30 seconds, out of a tot-
al of three weapons.
p
The next possible T-62 or BMP-76 loss would have been at
60 seconds of the battle; whereas BLUE losses were projected
to continue to occur at an increasing rate due to the entran-




The initial conclusion for this particular scenario would be to have
the mech infantry platoon begin to withdraw after all systems have
fired one round each. And, to either position the HAW and M60A2 at
initially greater ranges, or break contact after the first rounds have
impacted. Further examination of Figure 28, in conjunction with the
TIME-HISTORY forms reveals an interesting point: the only RED
systems to achieve significant kills on the BLUE ATGM systems,
with the exception of the MAW losses, are the BMP-76s armed with
the SAGGER ATGM. These two alone counted, with one missile apiece,
for 38. 85 points of BLUE force losses. Since these were assumed only
capable of firing one missile per engagement, due to the exposure
required to mount a new missile on the main gun tube during a fire-
fight, and the RED AFV fire was otherwise not that significant; it
appears as though the first priority for BLUE ATGM systems should
be the overwatching RED ATGMs. This would then give the BLUE
systems greater flexibility in engaging the tanks. (Note that removal
the effect of the RED ATGMs and the high MAW losses, assuming an
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